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Abstract: State-driven litigation has had increasing influence in the development of national
policy in recent years, including in national health policy. One prominent recent example
includes the efforts of several state governments to bring coordinated constitutional
challenges against one of the Obama Administration’s key first term achievements, the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. This paper examines how states have influenced
health care policy influence in a more subtle but no less important litigation campaign. Over
the past decade, state prosecutors have reached numerous multi-million dollar settlements
with the nation’s largest pharmaceutical companies imposing a variety of restrictions on
prescription drug pricing and advertising. Though often relying upon state law claims, these
settlements have created new de facto national standards covering the drug industry –
frequently going beyond and even against express congressional action. Relying upon an
analysis of numerous legal cases, investigations, and settlements, this paper traces the
development of this persistent litigation campaign and discusses the wide policy implications
state litigation has had in this area. In doing so, the paper raises important broader
questions about the operation of modern American public policy.
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A longstanding feature of the American political system is its
remarkable fragmentation. Political power is distributed not only
horizontally among the three main branches of government but
vertically between the federal government and a myriad of state and
local government actors. Despite increasing centralization of power in
the federal government during the twentieth century, this significant
structural fragmentation is kept alive by record levels of public
mistrust of the federal government on both ends of the political
spectrum.
As many scholars have noted, this structural fragmentation has
important consequences for public policy. Perhaps most importantly, it
creates special political challenges in an era in which increasing
political polarization combines with public demands for the government
to solve problems. There have been suggestions that this political
polarization and structural fragmentation is a recipe for perpetual
gridlock, demanding a radical overhaul of the structure of the system.1
Other scholars have highlighted how the many veto points available to
opponents of policy change have led to attempts at "unorthodox
lawmaking" in various venues.2 One of these methods of unorthodox
lawmaking has been an increasing reliance on courts and litigation as a
way to resolve disputes and implement public policy – a dynamic
Robert Kagan has termed "adversarial legalism."3
This paper examines an important yet underappreciated new
development in the politics of adversarial legalism, one illustrating how
the fragmentation of the American political system creates not just
veto points and perpetual gridlock but "opportunity points" for policy
development as well.4 In recent years, state prosecutors have become
key opportunity points as they have increasingly turned to litigation
consciously aimed at changing policy. Most famously, forty-six states
negotiated a massive settlement with several tobacco firms in 1998
that included not just massive payouts to the states but a host of new

1

Sanford Levinson, Our Democratic Constitution (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press,
2006).
2 Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking, 4th ed. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2011).
3 Robert Kagan, Adversarial Legalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2001).
4 The notion of "opportunity points" is borrowed from R. Shep Melnick, Between the
Lines: Interpreting Welfare Rights (Washington D.C.: Brookings Instit. Press, 1994):
140-141.
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regulatory requirements on the tobacco industry.5 The states’ more
recent litigation campaigns have been at least as consequential as this
earlier tobacco litigation. Several states have filed challenges to a
variety of Obama Administration priorities, including most prominently
the signature achievement of the Obama presidency to date – the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). During the George
W. Bush Administration, several states brought lawsuits against the
Environmental Protection Agency, eventually winning several key
cases concerning climate change and acid rain policy.6
Much state litigation, as with the tobacco litigation, has targeted
private industry. In conjunction with federal prosecutors, for example,
states have recently negotiated a giant $26 billion settlement with the
nation’s largest banks concerning the banks’ role in the foreclosure
crisis.7 In addition to the money involved, this settlement requires
banks to change the way they service home loans and grants greater
state oversight of federally regulated banks. Through litigation, the
states have also targeted practices of Internet firms, major beverage
manufacturers, the financial sector, and many other firms, wresting
settlements imposing new regulatory requirements not required by
federal regulators. Most importantly for the purposes of this paper,
states have brought dozens of lawsuits against drug companies
seeking not only monetary recoveries but important regulatory
changes throughout the pharmaceutical industry.
Whether targeting the federal government or private
corporations, the effect and often the explicit intent of this state-driven
litigation is to change public policy. State litigation against the federal
government aims to nullify congressional enactments such as the
PPACA or force federal agencies such as the Environmental Protection
Agency to change their regulatory posture. State litigation against
large private corporations aims at reaching major settlements
containing a mix of monetary and regulatory provisions. These
settlements have succeeded in creating new de facto national

Martha Derthick, Up in Smoke: From Legislation to Litigation in Tobacco Politics
(Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2005).
6 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
7 Nelson D. Schwartz and Shaila Dewan, "States Negotiate $26 Billion Agreement for
Homeowners," New York Times, February 8, 2012.
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standards covering a variety of industries – frequently going beyond
and even against express congressional action.
I focus on pharmaceutical litigation in this paper for a number of
reasons. First, the developments I describe in this paper have been
vitally important in the overall picture of health care policy – a policy
area touching upon a significant percentage of the American economy.
Through litigation conducted both independently and in conjunction
with federal prosecutors and private litigators, states have subtly
transformed the regulatory landscape for pharmaceutical products.
This has been particularly true in the area of drug pricing and
marketing.
Second, the state-driven pharmaceutical litigation described in
this paper is part of a larger dynamic in which states have increasingly
turned to litigation to achieve their policy goals. As the examples
briefly noted previously indicate, states have engaged in regulatory
litigation in a variety of policy areas including environmental
protection, consumer protection, and antitrust enforcement. They have
sought (and achieved) stricter oversight of industries ranging from
mortgage lenders to Internet firms. In many of these areas, the states
have claimed that they were acting to fill "regulatory gaps" left open
by congressional or administrative inaction on the federal level.
Further, the emergence of state litigation in this area is a
reminder of how policymaking in the fragmented American political
system requires attention to the many interactions between different
political institutions and different levels of government. Litigation,
including state litigation, is best analyzed not in isolation but as part of
the larger system of public policy in which developments on one level
affect developments on another.8 Understanding how and why states
have increasingly turned to litigation as a powerful regulatory tool
requires examining the actions of other political actors in the political
system, including Congress and federal administrative agencies. For
scholars interested in the dynamics of contemporary policymaking and
regulation, this development is a reminder to be mindful of the many
For other studies emphasizing the important of inter-branch relationships, see
Thomas Burke, Lawyers, Lawsuits, and Legal Rights (Berkeley, CA: U. of California
Press, 2002); Jeb Barnes, Overruled? Legislative Overrides, Pluralism, and
Contemporary Court-Congress Relations (Stanford, CA: Stanford U. Press, 2004);
Sean Farhang, The Litigation State: Public Regulation and Private Lawsuits in the U.S.
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010),,.
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important and consequential complexities of the American political
system.

Lawyers, Drugs, and Money: Litigating
Pharmaceutical Prices
The health care sector represents one of the largest and fastestgrowing shares of the American economy, with total health care
spending representing more than 17% of the United States' entire
gross domestic product.9 A significant portion of this spending is
associated with spending for pharmaceutical products, which reached
$307 billion in 2010.10 This rapid rise in health care costs has led to
health care policy emerging as one of the most hotly contested items
on the political agenda in recent years.
Because of the role prescription drugs have played as a driver of
health care costs, pharmaceutical companies have increasingly come
under the spotlight. The high cost of prescription drugs is of interest to
state governments as well as the federal government because the
Medicaid program, which provides medical care to those unable to pay
for it, is jointly funded by both levels of government. Several members
of Congress have suggested that the high costs of pharmaceuticals are
the result of unscrupulous business practices, and several states have
enacted legislation aimed at reducing the costs of prescription drugs
for their residents.11 Perhaps the most consequential development,
however, has been state efforts to regulate drug prices through
litigation.

"Health Care's Share of U.S. Economy Rose at Record Rate," New York Times,
February 4, 2010.
10 Gary Gatyas, "IMS Institute Reports U.S. Spending on Medicines Grew 2.3 Percent
in 2010, to $307.4
Billion,”http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/ims/menuitem.d248e29c86589c9c30e8
1c033208c22a/?vgnextoid=24b2f14cddc40310VgnVCM10000071812ca2RCRD&vgnext
fmt=default.
11 For a good overview of these state legislative efforts, see John Bentivoglio,
Rosemary Maxwell, and Marc Stanislawczyk, "State Controls on Drug Costs: An Outof-Control Experiment in Federalism?" Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, October
11, 2001. Also see Jill Wechler, "'War On Drugs' Attacks High Prices," Pharmaceutical
Technology, June 2000, 14.
9
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Prescription Drug Reimbursement in the Medicaid
Program
Before discussing these litigation efforts, it is important to
understand the structure of Medicaid and how the program pays for
prescription drugs. Unlike the federally funded and administered
Medicare program, the health insurance program for the elderly,
Medicaid places much of the responsibility for program operations on
the states. Every state must create an agency to implement the
Medicaid program, which is in turn overseen by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services within the Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS"). These state agencies are tasked with
carrying out various details of program administration.
As a joint federal/state venture, the funding for Medicaid
services is also a shared responsibility between the two levels of
government. The amount of the federal share for Medicaid payments
varies from 50% to 76% of the total program costs, depending on the
state. As of 2009, the total program costs for Medicaid totaled $373.9
billion.12 These costs have risen rapidly over the course of Medicaid’s
existence, driven in large part by the rapid increase in expenditures for
pharmaceuticals. Unlike Medicare, which provided only a limited
number of prescription drugs under the Part B health insurance
program prior to the adoption of the Medicare Part D prescription drug
benefit in 2005, Medicaid pays for a variety of prescription drugs for
eligible individuals. Between 1997 and 2000, expenditures under
Medicaid's drug benefit grew at an average annual rate of 18.1%,
more than two times the 7.7% annual growth in total Medicaid
spending.13
Pharmaceutical companies are not reimbursed directly under
Medicaid. Instead, health care providers (such as pharmacies) pay
drug companies for the drugs and are then reimbursed by the
government according to a pricing benchmark for each drug. In both
the Medicaid and Medicare programs, this pricing benchmark has long
been the "Average Wholesale Price" (AWP) of the drug. In theory, the
Center for Medicaid Services, "National Health Expenditures 2009 Highlights,"
accessed March 9, 2012,
http://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf.
13 Dawn M. Gencarelli, "Average Wholesale Price for Prescription Drugs: Is There a
More Appropriate Pricing Mechanism?" National Health Policy Forum, June 7, 2002.
12
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AWP is meant to reflect the average price at which wholesalers sell
prescription drugs to physicians, pharmacies, and other customers.
The AWP, however, has no statutory definition, and the states have
relied upon commercial publishers of drug pricing data, the most
prominent being First DataBank, for the AWPs of drugs covered by
Medicaid. These commercial publishers in turn receive the AWP pricing
information "based on data obtained from manufacturers, distributors,
and other suppliers."14 In other words, the AWPs for any given drug
have no set benchmark but instead originate from information
provided by the manufacturers of that drug. Because of this
manufacturer-reported pricing system, the AWP is akin to a "sticker
price" or "list price" similar to those used in automobile sales.
Because the term "AWP" is not defined in law or regulation, the
manufacturer may set the AWP at any level, regardless of the actual
price paid by purchasers. A major consequence of this pricing system
is that it gives health care providers – whom the government
reimburses for their drug purchases based upon the AWP benchmark –
an incentive to prescribe drugs where the greatest difference exists
between the listed AWP and the actual price they pay for the drug.
This difference is often referred to as the "spread," which the providers
can then use to bolster their own revenues. This, in turn, gives drug
manufacturers an incentive to increase the spread by increasing the
AWP benchmark they report to commercial drug price publishers such
as First DataBank. By doing so, drug companies can encourage the
utilization of their drugs by providing larger spreads to health care
providers.

The Clinton Administration Tries to Change the AWP
Benchmark
The government has long been aware of the potential that these
incentives would drive up drug costs. As early as 1968, the Task Force
on Prescription Drugs of the Department of Health Education and
Welfare noted that the AWP could be used as an "umbrella" beneath
which the [pharmaceutical] company can maneuver against competing
products." In 1977, the Health Care Financing Administration (the
predecessor to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services within
Ibid.; Medical Economics Staff, eds., Red Book, 106th ed. (Montvale, N.J.: Thomson
Medical Economics, (2002), 169.
14
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HHS) unsuccessfully tried to get states to move away from AWP. As
concern about rising health care costs reached even higher levels in
the 1990s, President Clinton noted the potential for higher costs to the
government because of the flawed, but legal, AWP system. In a 1997
address calling for additional efforts to reduce health care costs,
Clinton explained the AWP system as an example of a type of "waste
and abuse" that "aren't even illegal [because] they're just embedded
in the practices of the system."15 For years, the difference between
AWP and the actual market prices for drugs led pharmaceutical
industry observers to refer to AWP as "Ain't What's Paid."16
Despite these concerns, neither Congress nor the states
replaced the use of the manufacturer-reported AWP benchmark. The
reason had largely to do with the testimony of physicians, particularly
oncologists, who argued that there would be no way for them to stay
in business and serve Medicare and Medicaid recipients without
benefiting from the "spread" created by the AWP.17 While the AWP
indeed exceeded the providers' costs for drugs, the spread helped to
make up for inadequate government payments related to other
professional services provided under Medicare and Medicaid.
Congress was generally swayed by these arguments,
particularly the prospect that AWP cuts would lead to more limited
access to services available to Medicare and Medicaid enrollees. This
was true even when the Clinton Administration made a significant push
in the 1990s to alter the AWP system for the purposes Medicare drug
reimbursements. In his 1998 budget proposal, Clinton proposed
eliminating AWP and replacing it with a formula directly related to
actual acquisition costs paid by providers. Congress rejected this
proposal, instead making much less drastic changes to the drug
reimbursement formula.18 The Administration subsequently fought for

James M. Spears and Jeff Pullman, "Using Litigation to Regulate Drug Prices: The
Assault," Medical Marketing and Media, June 2002, 72.
16
Paul E. Kalb, I. Scott Bass, and Robert Fabrikant, "The Average Wholesale Price: It
"Ain't What the Government Wants to Pay,‟ Health Care Fraud Report, February 21,
2001, 182.
17 Terry Carter, "Drug Wars," ABA Journal, December 2002, 44.
18 Public Law No. 105-33 §4556(a), 11 Stat. 251 (1997). Also see "Plan Targets
Medicare Waste to Save Billions," Washington Post, December 7, 1998, A2; Joan H.
Krause, "A Conceptual Model of Health Care Fraud Enforcement," Journal of Law and
Policy, 127 (2004).
15
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larger tweaks to the AWP payment system in both 1999 and 2000, but
neither of these proposals gained traction in Congress.

The Fight Moves from Congress to the Courts
Amidst these failed attempts at statutory changes of the AWP
formula in Congress, the Clinton Administration DOJ, along with
several states, began shifting to a litigation strategy by investigating
the use of AWP by certain pharmaceutical companies. The
investigation, which focused on the activities of more than a dozen
large pharmaceutical firms, examined the way in which drug
companies "marketed the spread" between AWP and actual costs to
provide incentives to providers to prescribe their products and apply
for reimbursements under Medicare and Medicaid. According to the
government prosecutors, this practice represented actionable fraud.
One letter from New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer to Medicaid
pharmacy directors across the country announced that this
investigation "has revealed a pattern of misrepresentation by some
drug manufacturers" resulting in Medicare and Medicaid "substantially"
overpaying for certain drugs.19 This "misrepresentation" was the use of
allegedly inflated AWP information reported by manufacturers to the
commercial publishers of drug pricing data.
The governments' first step was to pressure First DataBank, the
largest of these commercial publishers, to alter the way it reported
prices for several dozen prominent drugs. In the face of the growing
federal/state investigation, the company agreed in 2000 to list prices
that the state prosecutors determined were closer to what providers
actually paid for the drugs. Following this informal agreement, Spitzer
noted that this pricing change would likely result in "initial complaints
or objections about lowered Medicaid payments" by providers,20 which
is precisely what occurred when the Health Care Financing
Administration announced plans to use these new rates reported by
First DataBank to compensate providers.
Following the predicted outrage from health care providers,
particularly oncologists worried about reimbursement rates under
Medicare, Congress enacted the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP
Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000. This act, among
19
20

Julie Appleby, "Drug Pricing Probed," USA Today, April 6, 2000, 1A.
Ibid.
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other things, precluded the HHS Secretary from "directly or indirectly
decreas[ing] the rates or reimbursement...under the current
reimbursement methodology" until the General Accounting Office
released a study on the matter of AWP and it was reviewed by HHS.21
With Congress clearly hesitant to proceed with any significant
changes to the AWP system, state and federal prosecutors pressed
ahead with their investigation. The government coalition reported that
it had uncovered a variety of "fraudulent" behavior by the
pharmaceutical companies that had ultimately cost the federal and
state governments billions of dollars. Some of the activity was the sort
of garden-variety fraud the states had been prosecuting for years.
Central to the investigation, however, was the notion that marketing
the "spread" between the drug's listed AWP and the actual cost of that
drug represented illegal fraud. 22
The government coalition made clear that it was willing to turn
to active litigation if necessary to recover government funds expended
because of this alleged AWP fraud. The governments' legal hook relied
upon an innovative use of the False Claims Act ("FCA"), a Civil War-era
statute that originally aimed to crack down on "rampant fraud" among
defense contractors doing business with the Union army.23 The
prospect of FCA liability was particularly disturbing for pharmaceutical
firms, since every filled Medicare or Medicaid prescription might be
considered a "false claim" subject to treble damages and the
maximum penalty under the statute. These penalties could quickly add
up to create potential exposure to these firms running into the
hundreds of millions of dollars. Additionally, if a company was found
guilty of any criminal violations involved in a potential suit, the
company could be excluded from Medicare and other federal health
programs, a penalty some have described as a corporate "death
sentence."24 Under these conditions, drug companies quickly realized

§429(c) of the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection
Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-554).
22 Julie Appleby, "Drugmakers Accused of 'Unethical' Pricing," USA Today, September
27, 2000, 3B.
23 Joan H. Krause, "A Conceptual Model of Health Care Fraud Enforcement," Journal of
Law and Policy 12 (2004): 65.
24 Christopher D. Zalesky, "Pharmaceutical Marketing Practices: Balancing Public
Health and Law Enforcement Interests, Moving Beyond Regulation-Through-Litigation,"
Journal of Health Law 39(2): 235-264 (2006).
21
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that litigating any government claims all the way to a jury verdict
would be very risky and potentially fatal to the corporations.

The Precedent for "AWP as Fraud" – the Bayer and TAP
Pharmaceuticals Settlements
State and federal prosecutors understood the potential leverage
they maintained over potential drug company defendants because of
their FCA claims, and made no secret of the fact that they sought to
force a settlement with a major manufacturer in the hope that it would
set a precedent for other companies to move towards a more accurate
pricing system.25 In January of 2001, the government coalition
achieved its first major victory. Since May of the previous year, the
group had been in talks with Bayer Pharmaceuticals over the pricing of
several its drugs used to treat hemophilia and AIDS. The government
prosecutors alleged that Bayer was "marketing the spread" to
physicians and other health care providers and that the company had
inflated the cost of drugs under Medicaid.
Essentially, the governments argued that the way that Bayer
calculated the AWP for these drugs represented fraudulent actions
leading to liability under the FCA. Bayer, along with the rest of the
industry, argued that setting prices for AWP was in no way
"fraudulent" given that the government had known for years that
marketing the spread was an accepted industry practice and
nevertheless kept AWP as part of the government reimbursement
system. Nevertheless, under pressure from threatened litigation, Bayer
decided to settle the governments' allegations. In separate but closely
related settlements, the DOJ and the states reached an agreement
with Bayer containing a small monetary payment of $14 million to be
divided up between the federal government and the 45 states involved
in the suit. Reflecting the ambitions of the governments to use the
settlement to send a message to the pharmaceutical about the legality
of AWP, however, the importance of the regulatory requirements in the
settlement overshadowed the relatively minor monetary payments.
The key provision of the settlement required Bayer to report the
"average sale price" (ASP) for all of the drugs reimbursed by Medicaid

David S. Cloud and Laurie McGinley, "U.S., States, Bayer Start Settlement Talks,"
Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2000, A3.
25
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rather than the AWPs for each of these drugs.26 In contrast to AWP,
this new pricing benchmark was defined in the settlement as the
weighted average of all non-Federal sales of drugs to wholesalers,
including all discounts, rebates, and other benefits tied to the purchase
of the drug. Because the ASP, unlike the AWP, was a defined term and
set by the market rather than by the manufacturer, this was intended
to reduce the sort of price "manipulation" by the pharmaceutical
industry involved in these cases. Because companies could not create
a spread between the AWP and market prices, the aim was to reduce
costs of drugs reimbursed under government health care programs.
State Medicaid officials would be able to use the ASP data to set "fair"
reimbursement rates for prescription drugs.
The government prosecutors viewed the Bayer settlement as a
watershed agreement that could be used to replace the existing AWP
system with the "more accurate" ASP system. New York Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer characterized the settlement as "a significant
victory...[that] sends a strong message to other pharmaceutical
manufacturers and health care providers that we will not allow them to
enrich themselves at the expense of taxpayers and those most in
need."27 This "strong message" resonated across the industry, as
Bayer was but the first domino to fall in the government prosecutors'
strategy to attack the AWP reimbursement system.
The next domino was an even more significant agreement later
in 2001 involving TAP Pharmaceuticals and their cancer drug, Lupron.
In this case, the governments alleged that TAP engaged in a wide
range of illegal conduct, some of which appeared to be clear fraud
under existing federal statutes. This included allegations that TAP had
offered kickbacks to doctors to encourage them to prescribe TAP’s
products, in violation of federal law.
However, as with the Bayer case, the allegations also included
as evidence of "fraud" TAP's marketing the spread between its
published AWPs for Lupron and the actual purchase price. As with

Corporate Integrity Agreement between the Office of Inspector General of the
Department of Health and Human Services and Bayer Corporation (January 23, 2001),
11–12, accessed March 17, 2012,
http://www.oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/BayerCorporation120301.PDF.
27 Robert Pear, "Bayer to Pay $14 Million to Settle Charges of Causing Inflated
Medicaid Claims," New York Times, January 24, 2001, A16.
26
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Bayer, the TAP allegations aimed to introduce the notion that the AWP
payment system was inherently fraudulent. This was despite the fact,
as TAP argued, that "marketing the spread" and similar practices
concerning AWP had been legal for years – and that Congress had
even considered the spread an acceptable way to ensure that
physicians and other providers remain in the Medicare and Medicaid
programs.
However, the government prosecutors saw in the TAP case an
opportunity to make the statement that they had begun with Bayer.
Despite the legally questionable nature of these AWP claims in the
case, none of which had previously been tested in court, the
accusations of other illegal kickbacks and other violations of federal
law were on firmer legal ground. Because these charges could lead to
criminal as well as civil liability if proven in court, TAP faced the
prospect of exclusion from Medicare and other federal health
programs.
The threat of this "death sentence" gave the federal and state
prosecutors additional leverage to force a significant settlement related
to not only the kickback claims, but the alleged AWP fraud as well. In
October of 2001, the strategy came to fruition in the form of a massive
$875 million settlement between TAP and the government prosecutors,
the largest health care fraud settlement in history to that time.28 As
part of the settlement, TAP also entered into an agreement requiring
strict oversight of TAP’s marketing and sales practices for seven years,
the first ever settlement to require this sort of strict scrutiny. Perhaps
most importantly of all, the settlement required TAP to report the ASP
for each of its drugs on a quarterly basis, similar to the provision the
prosecutors had won in the Bayer settlement. The settlement also
permitted the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to rely
upon this ASP data in setting reimbursement rates for TAP's products
under Medicare as well as by state Medicaid programs in setting their
own reimbursements rates.29 This settlement provision therefore
allowed the CMS to go beyond its explicit authority established by

Department of Justice, "TAP Pharmaceutical Products Inc. and Seven Others
Charged With Health Care Crimes."
29 Settlement Agreement Between the United States and TAP Pharmaceutical Products,
Inc. (September 28, 2001), at §III.D.2.d.
28
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Congress, which had specifically set Medicare reimbursement rates
using AWP as the pricing formula.

The Floodgates Open and the States Rush In
These two settlements were viewed as watershed cases and a
"wake-up call" throughout the industry. As one health care fraud
attorney stated at the time, "[t]he TAP settlement sent a huge chill
through the pharmaceutical industry."30 Not only did the size of the
TAP settlement raise eyebrows throughout the pharmaceutical
industry, but both the Bayer and TAP settlements introduced the
notion that the AWP pricing mechanism, which had long been seen as
standard company practice, was inherently fraudulent.
State prosecutors fully understood that the Bayer and TAP
precedents opened up additional opportunities for state litigation. As
former Maine AG Andrew Ketterer stated at the time, "the area [of
AWP] is fertile for attorneys general to look into. Pharmaceutical
companies spend a fair amount of money on research and
development for wells that don't have oil and they have to recover
from those losses in some way. [A lawsuit] is not out of the range of
possibilities that would come on to the radar screen. It's an area that
is of great interest to a lot of people."31
Attorney General Ketterer's words proved prescient, because
states began litigating AWP suits independently of the federal
government during and especially shortly after the Bayer and TAP
settlements were announced. Republican Texas AG John Cornyn, in
the midst of the Bayer and TAP investigations, filed the first state AWP
lawsuit in the fall of 2000. Similar to the allegations in the Bayer and
TAP cases, this state lawsuit alleged that three pharmaceutical firms
had inflated the AWP for asthma inhalants and marketed the spread to
pharmacists.32
The suit had a near-immediate effect on how Texas reimbursed
drugs under its Medicaid program. Shortly after Cornyn filed the case,
the head of Texas's Medicaid program ordered an audit of its drug
Pamela M. Prah, "Fraud Cops Target Drug Makers, Clinical Trials," Kiplinger Business
Forecasts, April 9, 2002 (quoting David E. Matyas, a lawyer specializing in health care
fraud in the law firm of Epstein Becker & Green).
31 Guiden, "States Mull Suit."
32 Ibid.
30
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reimbursements, and soon after cut the reimbursement rates for the
drugs involved in the suit. Eventually, all three defendants named in
Texas's AWP lawsuit reached settlements with the Attorney General's
office. These settlements included combined monetary recoveries of
over $55 million, representing nearly twice the damages allegedly
caused by the defendant's "inflating" their drug prices. The
settlements also required the defendants to enter into pricing
agreements with the state Medicaid division to ensure "accurate"
pricing in the future.33
A number of other attorneys general across the country
piggybacked on Texas’s pioneering efforts by bringing expansive AWP
lawsuits of their own. In January of 2002, Nevada AG Frankie Sue Del
Papa filed a suit in Nevada state court accusing seventeen
pharmaceutical companies of inflating the AWPs and thus driving up
the costs of Nevada's Medicaid program. Del Papa's lawsuit went well
beyond that of Cornyn's in Texas. Not only did the state name a
broader range of defendants, but the complaint listed a variety of
Medicaid fraud, antitrust, and consumer protection claims in the
lawsuit.34 In addition to allegedly employing "deceptive practices"
constituting consumer fraud that harmed Nevada residents and the
state budget, Nevada alleged that the companies' behavior also
constituted a "racketeering enterprise" aimed at deriving profits from
states across the nation by inflating AWPs.35 "We're trying to assert
every possible claim of relief," stated Tim Terry, the chief of the
Nevada Medicaid fraud unit.36 The complaint also repeatedly referred
to the pharmaceutical companies' behavior as part of an "AWP
Scheme," a seeming attempt to coin a negative label for pricing
behavior that had for decades been part of the government's
reimbursement practice.
Del Papa explained her rationale for filing the lawsuit by noting
that "[t]his country and our state have struggled to provide costeffective health care while the elderly are often forced to choose
expensive medicines over food and housing." In Howard Beale-esqe
See, for example, Settlement Agreement and Release, State of Texas v. Roxane
Laboratories, No. GV3-03079 (District Court of Travis County, Texas), III(3).
34 Complaint For Injunctive Relief (State of Nevada v. Abbott Laboratories), Counts IVII.
35 Ibid., Count IV.
36 Caffrey, "States Go To Court."
33
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terms, she remarked, "[t]oday, we have fired the first salvo sending a
message on behalf of our state and our citizens that we aren't going to
take it anymore."37 In addition to requesting damages of "three times
the amount unlawfully obtained" and at least $5,000 for each allegedly
false claim – monetary recoveries that could easily reach at least into
the tens of millions – the complaint also asked for a redefinition of
AWP. Rather than continuing with the long-settled notion that AWP
represented the manufacturer-defined "sticker price" for prescription
drugs, the complaint requested "the Court enjoin defendants and order
that any and all future disseminations of AWP...accurately reflect the
average wholesale prices paid by physicians and pharmacies." Del
Papa noted that the breadth of the complaint meant that her litigation
"has nationwide applications because of its similarities to the historic
tobacco litigation in which the states eventually recovered billions of
dollars."38
A month after Nevada's lawsuit, Montana AG Mike McGrath filed
similar litigation. This state court lawsuit alleged very similar charges
against eighteen defendants, most of whom Nevada's suit also
targeted. Like Nevada's complaint, Montana's alleged the AWPs
reported by the pharmaceutical manufacturers bore little or no
relationship to prices actually paid by physicians or pharmacies in the
state.39 The complaint also contained a variety of causes of action,
seeking civil penalties of $2,000 per false claim, double damages, and
legal costs and fees.40 As with the Nevada lawsuit, the Montana
complaint also asked the court to "enjoin Defendants and order that
any and all future disseminations of AWP…accurately reflect the
average wholesale prices paid by physicians and pharmacies."

Subsequent Lawsuits and Litigation Successes
Building upon this earliest multistate AWP litigation, which also
included West Virginia, the quantity of litigation expanded, both in
terms of the number of states involved in bringing lawsuits as well as

Dana A. Elfin, "Nevada Sues Drug Companies to Recover Millions of Dollars in
Alleged Overpayments," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, January 24, 2002.
38 Elfin, "Nevada Sues Drug Companies."
39 Ibid.
40 Complaint For Injunctive Relief, Damages, Restitution, Disgorgement, Penalties and
Other Relief and Demand for Jury Trial, State of Montana v. Abbott Laboratories, et al
(First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County), Count V.
37
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the number of defendants involved in the lawsuits. Table 1 indicates
the progression of these lawsuits over time.
TABLE 1: AWP-RELATED STATE MEDICAID FRAUD LAWSUITS (THROUGH
2010)

State

Date Filed

Texas

September 2000

West Virginia
Nevada
Montana
Minnesota

October 2001
January 2002
January 2002
June 2002

California

January 2003

New York
Connecticut

February 2003
March 2003

Florida

July 2003

Kentucky
Massachusetts
Arkansas
Ohio
Pennsylvania
Wisconsin
Kentucky
Alabama
Illinois

September 2003
October 2003
January 2004
March 2004
March 2004
June 2004
November 2004
January 2005
February 2005

Missouri

May 2005

Mississippi
Arizona
Hawaii
Alaska
Idaho
Utah
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana

October 2005
December 2005
April 2006
October 2006
January 2007
September 2007
October 2007
November 2008
November 2010

Defendants
Dey Laboratories, Schering-Plough, and
Roxane
Schering-Plough and Abbott Labs
17 defendants
18 defendants
Pharmacia
Abbott Labs
(expanded to 39 defendants in September
2005)
Pharmacia and GlaxoSmithKline
7 defendants
3 defendants
(amended to included three others in April
2005)
5 defendants
13 defendants
4 defendants
5 defendants
13 (later expanded to 38)
20 defendants
41 defendants
72 defendants
48 defendants
Dey and Warrick
(expanded to 4 others in December 2005)
86 defendants
42 defendants
44 defendants
44 defendants
18 defendants
10 defendants
78 defendants
17 defendants
18 defendants

While states brought most of these suits in individual state
courts under state law, they collaborated closely on these cases. The
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key organizational mechanism was the Pharmaceutical Task Force
established in 2002 under the auspices of the National Association of
Attorneys General (NAAG). The goal of this Task Force was to
encourage communication and collaboration among the states and
accelerate and coordinate investigation and litigation efforts with other
states, federal enforcement agencies, and the private bar.41 The
coordination achieved with this NAAG Task Force helps explain the
similarity of the various state lawsuits brought against pharmaceutical
companies.
In addition to these state lawsuits, a wave of private party
lawsuits also emerged at the same time. This litigation involved a
number of patients, private insurers, labor unions, health care
advocates, and others. Many of these groups coordinated their
litigation under the direction of the "Prescription Access Project," a
coalition of over one hundred organizations founded in 2001 "working
to end illegal pharmaceutical industry practices and fighting for more
affordable drug prices."42 This private litigation attacked the same
general AWP practices as the state lawsuits.
Faced with a growing plethora of similar state and private party
lawsuits, the defendants sought to consolidate the claims in federal
court. Many of the states’ lawsuits, including those of Nevada,
Montana, and several others, were consolidated along with many of
the private claims in a massive lawsuit in federal district court in
Massachusetts, in a case known as In Re Pharmaceutical Industry
Average Wholesale Price Litigation.43 This litigation continued for
years, with the state plaintiffs winning several key motions. Perhaps
most importantly of all, in November of 2006 Judge Patti Saris adopted
the definition of AWP the states had urged. For the purposes of the
upcoming trial in the case, the pharmaceutical defendants had wanted
AWP to be defined as a term of art – as the "sticker price" that the
industry had long assumed AWP meant under federal drug
reimbursement practice. Instead, the court held that "[d]etermining
41

Meredyth Smith Andrus, Robert L. Hubbard, and Paul Novak, "State Attorneys
General: Efforts to Address the High Costs of Prescription Drugs," ABA Section of
Antitrust Law, accessed March 18, 2012, http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/atcommittees/at-state/pdf/publications/other-pubs/highcostofdrugs.pdf.
42 Prescription Access Litigation, "PAL Coalition," accessed March 11, 2012,
http://www.prescriptionaccess.org/about?id=0003.
43 Pharmaceutical Average Wholesale Price Litigation, Docket No. 01-CV-12257-PBS,
MDL No. 1456.
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the plain language meaning of the regulatory and statutory term
'average wholesale price' is a straightforward exercise that begins with
the dictionary."44 Using the "plain meaning" of the term meant that
AWP should be defined as the average price at which wholesalers sell
drugs to their customers – precisely the definition that the state
plaintiffs sought.45 This key decision undercut the companies'
contention that AWP was in fact "Ain't What's Paid."
The states also secured a number of multistate and individualstate settlements with many industry defendants as the In Re
Pharmaceutical Industry litigation continued. GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)
was the first defendant to resolve the claims it faced in the In Re
Pharmaceutical Industry litigation, entering into settlements with five
states and a number of private litigants concerning allegedly inflated
AWPs for two of the company's cancer medications, Zofran and Kytril.
In addition to a $70 million monetary payment split between the
various plaintiffs, the company was also required to report the ASPs
for the two drugs to the states' Medicaid programs. Gaining this
information was critical to the states, since these prices, which were
not previously available, could form a new baseline for Medicaid
reimbursements in these states. Combined with an earlier settlement
with GSK, these settlements were viewed by one of the private
plaintiffs as "a nail in the coffin of AWP and a move toward a more
transparent system that will prevent drug companies from charging
inflated prices that have no relation to the actual cost of a drug."46
Eliot Spitzer described the lawsuit as helping "stop a longstanding
practice that inflated the cost of drugs for people suffering from cancer
and cheated the Medicaid system."47
Shortly after GSK settled, other defendants involved in the
federal district court case followed suit. This included AstraZeneca in
May of 2007 regarding Zolodex, and eleven other companies in March
of 2008. Many of these settlements were precipitated by a victory on
the merits by several of the private plaintiffs in one part of the In Re
44

"As Drug Pricing Trial Begins, Judge Says Meaning of 'Average Wholesale Price'
Plain," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, November 10, 2006, 1167.
45 Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, In Re Pharmaceutical Industry Average
Wholesale Price Litigation, M.D.L. No. 1456 (D. Mass, June 21, 2007), 144.
46 Martha Kessler, "GSK Pays $70 Million to Settle Lawsuit Alleging Artificial Inflation of
Drug Prices," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, August 18, 2006, 909.
47 Office of the New York Attorney General, "Leading Pharmaceutical Company
Settles."
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Pharmaceutical Industry consolidated federal case. In a ruling handed
down in July 2007, Judge Saris held that the industry defendants
"unfairly and deceptively caused to be published false AWPs...knowing
that [third party payers] and the government did not understand the
extent of the mega-spreads between published prices and true
average provider acquisition costs." Saris adopted the characterization
of the companies' activities as an "AWP Scheme," finding that the
companies' "[u]nscrupulously taking advantage of the flawed AWP
system for Medicare reimbursement by establishing secret megaspreads far beyond the standard industry markup was unethical and
oppressive...[causing] real injuries to the insurers and the patients
who were paying grossly inflated prices for critically important, often
life-sustaining, drugs."48 Following this order, several of the states'
cases consolidated in the lawsuit settled out-of-court.49
AWP litigation continues to this day, with states reaching
individual and multistate settlements with pharmaceutical company
defendants. While the days of the AWP benchmark may be numbered
largely because of these lawsuits, AWP litigation will likely continue,
especially since the government has stated that drug prices are still
inflated.50 Indeed, the states have worked closely together to settle
several multi-million dollar multistate lawsuits throughout the past few
years.

AWP Litigation as Political Strategy
Throughout the AWP litigation campaign conducted by the states
and other parties over the past decade, the states made no secret that
they were attempting to alter practices in the pharmaceutical industry
on a national scale. As Ohio Attorney General Betty Montgomery
stated in reference to the states' pharmaceutical litigation, "[o]ur
major task is to change behavior. Money is incidental." Another
observer noted that in this AWP litigation, state prosecutors were
"filing cases where they know full well it's not clear that they can win if
48

Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law, In Re Pharmaceutical Industry, 144. Also
see "Court Says Rx Companies Engaged in Unfair Pricing Practices by Inflating Average
Prices," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, June 29, 2007, 667.
49 See, for example, Richard Vanderford, "Teva to Pay $315M to Settle Price Inflation
Suits," Law 360, February 5, 2010 (noting that "Teva joins several drug companies
that have already settled the AWP legislation").
50 James Swann, "Medicaid Payments Still Inflated for Many Drugs, OIG Report Finds,"
Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, January 22, 2010, 96.
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they go to trial...they're not seeking damages in many of these
situations – they're seeking structured settlements."51
Through these lawsuits and settlements, the states sought to
change the long-standing industry practice of using AWP as an
incentive for health care providers to prescribe their prescription drug
products – a practice Congress repeatedly countenanced as a way to
compensate providers for losses incurred by their provision of other
services under Medicare and Medicaid. For all of the flaws in the
system, the industry relied upon and accepted this practice. "Three or
four years ago, if you surveyed manufacturers and asked if AWPs were
kickbacks," stated one attorney for the industry following the TAP
settlement, "they'd have looked at you like you were from another
planet."52 Yet through this explosion of litigation and settlements, the
states (in conjunction with federal prosecutors and private litigants in
several cases) have transformed the meaning of "health care fraud" to
mean something completely different from what Congress and the
industry alike understood it to mean for decades.
This litigation campaign occurred as policy advocates for stricter
price controls on prescription drugs attempted to alter the way
government provided reimbursement prescription drugs both on the
national level and in the states. A Maine statute enacted in 2000
placed price controls on drugs sold in the state, making it "illegal
profiteering" for a drug manufacturer to charge a price that is
"unconscionable" or produces an "unjust or unreasonable profit." Other
states, including Indiana, attempted to cut Medicaid reimbursement
rates paid to pharmacies unilaterally. These state legislative and
administrative strategies, however, faced the problem that their
impact was limited to individual states, as well as the fact that these
policy developments were frequently challenged in court. Courts
granted injunctions to stop states from unilateral cuts in
reimbursement rates, for example, and the Maine price control law and
similar statutes were challenged in court by the pharmaceutical

"New Cops on the Beat," Institutional Investor Magazine, July 24, 2002; Reed
Abelson and Jonathan D. Glater, "New York Will Sue 2 Big Drug Makers on Doctor
Discount," New York Times, February 13, 2003, A1.
52 Carter, "Drug Wars," at 44.
51
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industry's peak association, PhRMA.53 Meanwhile, industry critics in
Congress were losing their battle to end AWP on a national level,
winning only modest reductions in prescription drug reimbursement
rates.
The campaign to redefine AWP by means of litigation solved
both problems by sidestepping Congress to force drug pricing changes
throughout the entire industry. In many of these cases, the states
teamed up with both private class action attorneys and public interest
groups to attack AWP as fraudulent and attempt to change the pricing
benchmark from the previously long-standing practice. The litigation
was also an attempt to obtain more information about drug prices,
which could be used both in future litigation as well as to alter the
states' payments for drugs. Texas's AWP litigation provides an
example of this, with the state Medicaid agency relying upon the
"accurate transaction prices" obtained by the Texas AG through
settlements to set the new reimbursement benchmark for state
Medicaid payments.54
Further, these lawsuits continued to exert more pressure on
Congress to address alleged "regulatory lapses" in the area of drug
pricing. As noted earlier, Congress had declined to change the AWP
system for years. However, as government prosecutors reached
significant settlements with Bayer and TAP, and AWP litigation
proliferated in courtrooms all around the country, Congress finally
acted. In the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and
Modernization Act, signed into law in December of 2003, Congress
addressed the issue of prescription drug reimbursement under
Medicare. The provisions intended to reduce Medicare’s reimbursement
rates for physician-administered prescription drugs while at the same
time increasing reimbursement rates for the services associated with
administering those drugs.55

For a good overview, see John Bentivoglio, Rosemary Maxwell, and Marc
Stanislawczyk, "State Controls on Drug Costs: An Out-of-Control Experiment in
Federalism?" Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, October 11, 2001.
54 Sugerman-Brozan and Woolman, "Drug Spending and the Average Wholesale Price"
("States stick with AWP because they do not have access to more accurate information
and they do not have the capacity to collect it themselves").
55 Covington & Burling, "Average Wholesale Price Reform Provisions of the Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003," December 11, 2003,
accessed March 11, 2012, http://www.cov.com/files/Publication/2533fcae-e193-44a953
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Most importantly, Congress changed the pricing benchmark
from AWP to the "Average Sales Price" – precisely the benchmark
state and federal prosecutors had devised in the Bayer and TAP
settlements and that various states cited in their own individual
lawsuits and settlements. Under the Medicare Modernization Act,
Congress set the new prescription drug reimbursement for Medicare at
106% of ASP. The Act defined ASP in the same way as did the Bayer
and TAP settlements – as an average of the final sales prices to all U.S.
purchasers, net of rebates and other discounts. Congress also required
companies participating in the Medicare program to report the ASPs for
their drugs to CMS on a quarterly basis, similar to the provisions
previously achieved in the Bayer and TAP settlements.56 These
congressional changes came only after the concerted litigation
campaign by government prosecutors and a series of settlements
provided a model for later statutory changes.
In short, the states' AWP litigation, along with the federal and
private lawsuits, had several effects on the industry. For one, it was
part of a concerted campaign to redefine the existing AWP system as
industry "fraud," despite neither Congress nor state Medicaid agencies
electing to change the system. Second, through a series of
settlements, states were able to achieve regulatory settlements
creating an alternative pricing benchmark and placing additional
pricing disclosure requirements on drug firms. Third, following these
successful settlements, Congress reacted not by preempting the
litigation for encroaching upon its legislative jurisdiction and
threatening previously agreed-upon congressional policies. Instead,
Congress ratified several of the elements previously contained in these
settlements. The result has been the gradual decline of AWP as a
pricing benchmark, a policy change with implications reverberating
throughout the health care industry.

befc cb5a28d97c64/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/62931884-6610-481d-a563
e0880edf15f6/oid9743.pdf.
56 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Public
Law 108-173, U.S. Statutes at Large 117 (2003): 2067, codified at 42 U.S.C.
1395w(3)(a).
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Standing in for the FDA: Litigating Pharmaceutical Advertising
In addition to seeking dramatic changes in government drug
reimbursements, states have also sought to regulate the advertising
and marketing of pharmaceutical products through litigation
strategies. Like the drug pricing litigation, this litigation effort is
premised on the notion that certain actions by pharmaceutical firms
have driven up the cost of prescription drugs. Also like the pricing
litigation, state litigation has employed a sue-and-settlement strategy
that has achieved numerous regulatory changes that have resonated
throughout the industry and in Congress, ultimately resulting in
stricter regulation of pharmaceutical advertising. Much of this activity
has occurred even as both Congress and the Food and Drug
Administration, which retains the primary responsibility of regulating
prescription drug advertisements, have loosened restrictions on
pharmaceutical advertising to doctors and consumers.

Loosening Federal Restrictions on Direct-to-Consumer
Advertising and Off-Label Marketing
State litigation concerning pharmaceutical marketing has
focused on two key forms of pharmaceutical marketing: direct-toconsumer (or "DTC") advertising and off-label marketing. DTC
advertising strategies, as the name suggests, focus on marketing
pharmaceuticals to consumers through broadcast and print media as
opposed to solely focusing marketing efforts on doctors and other
health care providers. DTC advertising became much more prominent
in the United States beginning in the 1980s. This was due in part to
the decision of the Reagan Administration’s FDA to adopt a relatively
"hands-off" approach to DTC advertisement regulation, after some
initial consumer-related concerns, because of the agency’s conclusion
that restrictions would violate the First Amendment and because the
agency believed that existing federal law provided adequate consumer
protections.
Most DTC advertisements throughout the 1980s and 1990s
remained in print due to a FDA requirement that all advertisements
aimed at consumers include all warnings, precautions, and adverse
side effects of the drug. These requirements made short broadcast
advertisements all but impossible. In the mid-1990s, the FDA began to
reevaluate this policy, and in 1997 the FDA released new guidelines to
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the pharmaceutical industry entitled "Guidance for Industry:
Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements."57 This guidance
clarified existing regulations concerning broadcast advertising of
prescription drugs, making clear that pharmaceutical firms were no
longer required to state every warning and side effect associated with
the drug. Instead, the advertisements need only grant consumers
"reasonably convenient access to the advertised product's approved
labeling" through a telephone number, website, or referral to a
healthcare professional.58
This FDA Guidance made it much easier for pharmaceutical
firms to advertise their products in the broadcast media and helped
lead to a sharp increase in DTC ads overall. For example, one study
found that DTC advertising increased by 330% between 1996 and
2005.59 Another study in 2008 found that pharmaceutical
manufacturers spent approximately $4.8 billion on direct-to-consumer
television, radio, magazine, and newspaper advertising.60 This
burgeoning DTC advertising in America contrasts with nearly every
other nation, as DTC advertising is highly restricted or illegal in every
other country with the exception of New Zealand.
In addition to paving the way for greater DTC advertising, the
federal government has also loosened restrictions on so-called "offlabel" marketing. Prior to the FDA's approval of a drug, the company
must prove that the drug is "safe and effective for its intended
use(s)."61 When a drug is approved for a particular intended use, the
drug's labeling must reflect only this use. Promotion of a drug for uses
beyond those specified on the labeling is generally prohibited. This
restriction on promoting drugs for off-label use helps ensure that all
drugs pass through the proper procedures to be deemed appropriate
for "safe and effective" use.

FDA, "Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements," April
18, 2002, accessed March 17, 2011,
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm125039.htm.
58 Ibid. See also Steven A. Sheller, "Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: The Case for
Regulation," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, April 9, 2004, 407.
59 "Spending on Direct-to-Consumer Drug Ads Increased in Spite of Criticism, Study
Finds," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, August 24, 2007, 888.
60 Natasha Singer, "Citing Risks, Lawmakers Seek to Curb Drug Commercials," New
York Times, July 27, 2009, 1.
61 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
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Despite this general prohibition on promoting the off-label
utilization of prescription drugs, however, the underlying federal
statutory scheme recognizes the considerable medical benefits that
can flow from the off-label use of drugs. For that reason, doctors and
other health care professionals can legally prescribe drugs for off-label
purposes. Indeed, for a number of drugs, this off-label prescribing is
very common. One 2006 study found that more than 20% of
prescriptions written for the most commonly used prescription drugs in
the United States were prescribed for off-label use.62 The National
Comprehensive Cancer Network estimates that between 50% and 75%
of all uses of cancer drugs were off-label.63
The public health benefits of off-label uses spurred lawmakers to
reconsider the extent of the restrictions on the off-label promotion of
prescription drugs. In the same year that the FDA issued its Guidance
concerning DTC advertising, Congress enacted the FDA Modernization
Act of 1997. This statute abolished the long-standing prohibition on
drug manufacturers disseminating information related to "off-label"
uses of their products to healthcare providers.64 While maintaining the
general prohibition on off-label promotion, this statute allowed firms to
provide doctors with information about how their drugs might be used
to treat conditions for which the FDA had not approved. For example,
the statute allows firms to disseminate peer-reviewed journal articles
regarding off-label uses for their products. Doctors, as they had
before, were still free to prescribe drugs for off-label uses.

Balancing Priorities in Advertising
Much like the debates about the proper pricing mechanism for
prescription drugs under Medicaid, the conversation about
pharmaceutical advertising was about how to best balance competing
concerns. On the one hand, critics of loosening restrictions of
prescription drug advertising have focused on the potentially negative
effects such advertisements might have on consumers. Such critics
have claimed that DTC advertisements are at best unnecessary and at
David C. Radley, Stan N. Finkelstein, and Randall S. Stafford, "Off-Label Prescribing
Among Office-Based Physicians," Archives of Internal Medicine 166:1021-1026 (2006).
63 Vicki W. Girard, "Punishing Pharmaceutical Companies for Unlawful Promotion of
Approved Drugs: Why the False Claims Act is the Wrong Rx," Journal of Health Care
Law & Policy, 12:131 (2009).
64 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-115), 111 Stat.
2330.
62
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worst completely misleading to consumers.65 In addition, by heavily
promoting the use of brand-name drugs rather than generic
equivalents, critics argued that DTC advertising may be partially
responsible for driving up health care costs. For example, one 2000
study examining drug inflation found that the fifty drugs most
frequently advertised to consumers in 2000 were responsible for
47.8% of the rise in retail spending on prescription drugs from 1999 to
2000.66 Critics have also suggested that allowing companies to suggest
the benefits of off-label use of their drugs to healthcare professionals
risks subverting the entire system of FDA regulation. Because the FDA
has not evaluated off-label uses of drugs, the increased use of off-label
utilization may lead to the very sort of public health risks that
necessitated stronger FDA regulation in the first place.
On the other hand, others have noted the public health benefits
associated with DTC advertising and off-label drug utilization. DTC
advertising, for example, may help patients realize that their condition
is treatable and may spur medically helpful conversations with his or
her doctor. Pharmaceutical firms have also been quick to point out
evidence that DTC ads may improve health care by increasing patient
compliance with their therapies.67 Further, allowing greater
dissemination of information regarding off-label use can give doctors
and their patients more options in their health care treatments.
The federal government has balanced these competing concerns
by retaining certain restrictions on prescription drug advertising while
also moving away from wholesale advertising prohibitions. The FDA
Modernization Act of 1997 recognized a balance between the need to
regulate new drug utilizations as well as the potential health benefits
of off-label use, a balance generally shared by the FDA. Officials at the
FDA have also noted that there is "no evidence that DTC promotion is
harming the public health" by, for example, encouraging doctors to
prescribe inappropriate medications.68 The FDA has thus taken a more

65

Amanda Gardner, "Direct-to-Consumer Ads Booming Despite Criticisms," Healthday
Reporter, August 15, 2007.
66 "Study Says Direct Consumer Ads Play Big Part in Increased Drug Spending,"
Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, November 29, 2001.
67 "DTC Ads: Promoting Compliance a Win-Win Prospect," Pharmaceutical Executive
(December 1999).
68 Dana A. Elfin, "Drug Ads Don't Cause Improper Prescribing, Top FDA Official Tells
Senate Subcommittee," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, July 26, 2001.
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hands-off approach to DTC advertising, believing that the benefits of
this advertising outweigh any of the potential negatives.
This hands-off approach has generated plenty of criticism in
Congress and elsewhere. Testimony in one congressional panel in
2001, for example, noted a more than 50% drop-off in overall FDA
enforcement actions from 1997 to 2001.69 Another recent study also
cited the decreasing FDA enforcement during the George W. Bush
Administration, noting that the FDA had issued 142 warning letters in
1997, but only 21 in 2006.70 Members of Congress also began
criticizing the FDA's alleged lack of strong enforcement. Representative
Henry Waxman (D-CA), a frequent critic of the pharmaceutical
industry, issued a report in 2004 claiming that the FDA was guilty of
"weak enforcement" of rules regarding "false and misleading" drug
advertisements.71 Waxman's report demanded that the FDA
Commissioner, Mark McClellan, explain why the FDA was not taking
more aggressive enforcement actions. The Government Accountability
Office released a report in 2006 raising similar concerns criticizing the
FDA’s effectiveness in overseeing DTC advertising and in reducing
consumers' exposure to false and misleading advertising.72 One theme
running through these criticisms of the FDA was that the agency's
alleged lack of oversight of DTC advertising and off-label uses had the
effect of driving up the costs of health care by unnecessarily
encouraging greater utilization of brand-name pharmaceuticals.73

Multistate Litigation Concerning Pharmaceutical
Advertising
It was in this political context that state prosecutors became
considerably more active in using litigation to challenge the way
pharmaceutical companies market their products. As the examples
below illustrate, this litigation has resulted in greater limits on drug
marketing and has created new regulatory requirements for the
settling firms to follow. Additionally, settlements between states and
69

Elfin, "Drug Ads Don't Cause."
"Spending on Direct-to-Consumer Drug Ads Increased."
71 "Waxman Report Says FDA Enforcement Of Misleading Advertising Rules
Ineffective," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, February 6, 2004, 147.
72 Bronwyn Davis, "Restrictions on DTC Drug Ads Needed To Protect Consumers,
House Democrats Say," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, May 16, 2008, 576.
73 Ziad F. Gellad, Kenneth W. Lyles, "Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of
Pharmaceuticals," American Journal of Medicine 120: 475-480 (2007), 478.
70
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drug firms have had the effect of expanding state regulatory oversight
of the pharmaceutical industry. By adopting the arguments of drug
advertising's critics and transforming them into a form of national
regulation, state litigation has effectively altered the balance between
competing concerns reached by federal regulators.

Limiting DTC Advertising
One of the states' first significant lawsuits concerning DTC
advertising involved Pfizer's blockbuster antibiotic drug, Zithromax.
Zithromax was (and is) approved by the FDA as a safe and effective
treatment for childhood ear infections, and Pfizer marketed the drug
for this purpose. In 2001, a coalition of nineteen states began
investigating Pfizer's advertising of Zithromax out of concerns that
some of the company's advertisements contained "false and deceptive"
claims under state consumer protection statutes.
The states claimed that while Pfizer's DTC advertising contained
information regarding how many doses and how often Zithromax
should be administered, it failed to disclose information about
antibiotic resistance and other factors that physicians must consider
before prescribing antibiotic treatment for ear infections. The states
also claimed that Pfizer had misrepresented the efficacy of Zithromax
in treating ear infections in comparison to other antibiotics on the
market. In the words of Connecticut AG (now Senator) Richard
Blumenthal, the states initiated this investigation because "[d]rug ads
like Pfizer's must put health before hype...[p]arents deserve to know
that the antibiotic won't work against viral infections, such as colds or
the flu, and that excess or unnecessary medication leads to antibiotic
resistant infections."74
Pfizer, however, noted that it was marketing Zithromax
consistently with all applicable federal laws as well as the FDAapproved labeling for the product. In fact, Pfizer had voluntarily
submitted the exact DTC advertisements challenged by the states to
the FDA for review before Pfizer ran the ads, and the FDA had
approved them. Once the DTC advertising was on the air, consistent

Assurance of Voluntary Compliance, In the Matter of Pfizer Inc. (December 27,
2002), ¶3; Connecticut Attorney General's Office, Press Release, "State Reaches
Agreement With Pfizer On Advertisement Of Antibiotics," January 6, 2003, accessed
March 17, 2012, http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=1778&Q=283978.
74
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with the agency's approval of the ads, the FDA had taken no
enforcement actions against Pfizer for its marketing of Zithromax.
Nevertheless, the states’ legal theories rested on state
consumer protection law, not federal labeling laws. The states claimed
that under the laws of the nineteen states involved in the
investigation, Pfizer's failure to disclose certain information and claims
about the efficacy of the drug represented fraudulent
misrepresentation and deceptive trade practices. Pfizer publically
denied the states' claims, but faced with the prospect of a protracted
and public litigation battle with a significant coalition of state
prosecutors, Pfizer agreed to enter into a settlement with the states in
December of 2002.
The amount of monetary recovery involved in the settlement
was a relatively small $6 million. Of this amount, Pfizer agreed to pay
$4 million to the states to cover all investigatory costs and attorneys'
fees. The remaining $2 million was to fund a public service
announcement campaign over the next three years to educate parents
about "the proper use of antibiotics" to treat childhood ear infections.
The settlement also prohibited Pfizer from mentioning Zithromax
specifically in any of these PSAs. To help enforce the provision, the
states required Pfizer to submit a "written affirmation setting forth
Pfizer's compliance" with these provisions to the nineteen signatory
attorney general offices.
Most importantly, the settlement also placed various restrictions
on Pfizer's DTC advertising of Zithromax in the future. First, the
settlement required Pfizer to cease the DTC ads that were the subjects
of the investigation. Additionally, the settlement required Pfizer to
make specific statements about Zithromax in all of its future
advertisements for the product. For example, the settlement required
Pfizer to including the following specific phase in their marketing:
"Remember that antibiotics don't work for viral infections, such as a
cold or flu, so don't insist on a prescription for an antibiotic. Only your
doctor can decide what type of infection your child has and the best
way to treat it." Finally, the settlement stated that if consumer ads for
Zithromax refer to data in a scientific study related to dosing
convenience, frequency of use or effectiveness, Pfizer must disclose
whether the study was published, peer-reviewed, or funded by Pfizer.
The company also must make available to consumers the full study or
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a summary of the study, and must post the study or a summary on its
Internet site. Federal law or the FDA required none of these various
disclosures and advertising changes. By requiring them in this
settlement, however, the states wanted to send a "strong message"
not only to Pfizer but also to the pharmaceutical industry generally
that (in the words of New York AG Eliot Spitzer) "advertisements that
mislead or fail to provide complete information about pharmaceutical
products will meet with tough enforcement actions."75
The states followed up this watershed settlement with Pfizer
with numerous additional multistate settlements with other major drug
manufacturers. Several of these settlements have served as a vehicle
to regulate pharmaceutical company behavior reaching beyond a
single blockbuster drug. One such settlement involved Bayer
Corporation and its cholesterol reduction drug Baycol. The FDA
approved Baycol in 1997, but following its post-marketing studies
Bayer learned that Baycol might lead to elevated instances of a rare
but severe muscle disorder. After notifying the FDA about this
possibility, Bayer voluntarily removed the product from the market
four years later. Following the voluntary recall, thirty states began
investigating Bayer in 2004. They claimed that while Bayer voluntarily
notified the FDA about possible problems with Baycol and
subsequently removed the FDA-approved product from the market,
the company violated state consumer protection laws by failing to
adequately warn prescribers and consumers about these problems
with Baycol.
The states saw in this case a way to reform the way in which
pharmaceutical firms disclosed the results of internal clinical studies of
drugs – an issue that was the contemporaneous subject of
considerable debate in Congress.76 To that point, neither Congress nor
the FDA placed requirements on companies to disclose the results of
both positive and negative clinical drug studies, as federal law required

Office of the Attorney General of New York, Press Release, "Ads for Leading
Antibiotic Found to Be Misleading," January 6, 2003, accessed March 17, 2012,
http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2003/jan/jan06a_03.html.
76 For example, Senators Ted Kennedy and Michael Enzi introduced the Enhancing
Drug Safety and Innovation Act in 2006 that would have required the establishment of
a publically available clinical trials database containing information about clinical trial
results. Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act of 2006 (S.3807, 109th Congress).
75
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only limited clinical trial disclosures.77 The main reason for this inaction
was because of concerns that releasing broader clinical trial data was
both unnecessary and could stifle innovation by revealing sensitive
business information.
Through a settlement reached by several states and Bayer in
January of 2007, however, states were able to achieve broader clinical
trial requirements that industry critics in Congress had been unable to
achieve. In addition to a payment of $8 million to the states to cover
litigation expenses, the settlement required Bayer to register clinical
trials of most of its prescription products, and post all results, not just
those with positive outcomes.78 The states intended this settlement to
serve as a stepping-stone for similar regulation of other large drug
firms. "By agreeing to publicly disclose information on both positive
and negative studies about the safety and efficacy of its drugs,"
Michigan AG Mike Cox stated, "Bayer has provided an important new
direction for the entire pharmaceutical industry to follow."79 In addition
to this important clinical trial provision, the settlement also required
Bayer to comply fully with state laws regulating marketing, sale, and
promotion of its pharmaceutical and biological products and from
making "false and misleading" claims relating to any of its product sold
in the United States.80

Limiting the Dissemination of Off-Label Drug Information
In addition to focusing on DTC advertising and alleged failures
to warn consumers about potential prescription drug side effects,
states have brought litigation against pharmaceutical companies
concerning the off-label use of drugs. Much as in the pricing litigation,
some of these cases have featured federal-state collaboration in
enforcement to achieve significant regulatory settlements. In other

For example, policy advocates had achieved limited clinical trial disclosures in the
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-115, § 113, 111
Stat. 2296), which mandated the creation of a website (clinicaltrials.gov) providing the
public with limited access to information regarding clinical trials for drugs developed to
treat serious or life-threatening illnesses.
78 See, for example, Final Judgment and Agreed Permanent Injunction, State of Texas
v. Bayer Corporation (District Court of Dallas County, Texas, 2007), ¶15-¶23.
79 Drew Douglas, "Bayer Agrees to Pay $8 Million, Post Results Of Study to Resolve
States’ Probe of Baycol," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, January 26, 2007,
83.
80Final Judgment and Agreed Permanent Injunction, State of Texas v. Bayer, ¶15.
77
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cases, states have worked independently of federal enforcers to reach
key settlements.
An early example of federal-state collaboration in this area
involved the governments' investigation into pharmaceutical giant
Warner-Lambert's marketing of Neurontin, which ended in a major
settlement in 2004. Neurontin was approved by the FDA specifically to
treat epilepsy, though the drug proved highly effective in treating
general pain, attention deficit disorder, and bipolar disease. These
alternative uses, as well as the drug's use of use and relative lack of
serious side effects, led to approximately 90% to 95% of Neurontin
prescriptions used for off-label purposes. In 1996, however, a former
employee of the company brought a whistleblower suit under the False
Claims Act, alleging that the division of Warner-Lambert tasked with
advertising the drug was marketing it for some of its many off-label
uses. Federal and state prosecutors subsequently intervened in the
case, alleging that Warner-Lambert had made false statements to
government health programs and offered illegal kickbacks to
prescribers, in the form of trips and falsely labeled consulting fees, to
promote off-label uses of Neurontin. The governments also claimed
that Warner-Lambert disseminated information to doctors about the
off-label uses of the drug in such a way that it constituted illegal offlabel marketing. These off-label marketing violations, the governments
claimed, led to the increased utilization of Neurontin under the
Medicaid program, helping to drive up costs for the federal and state
governments.
The federal DOJ concentrated on the criminal allegations in the
case and collaborated with the states concerning the civil Medicaid
fraud aspects of the case, while the states activated not only their
fraud enforcement personnel for this case but their consumer
protection divisions as well. The states' consumer protection
investigation focused on alleged violations of state consumer
protection laws occurring when Warner-Lambert promoted the drug for
off-label uses. These consumer protection claims rested upon
innovative interpretations of existing law, raising questions both about
the theories of causation employed in the case as well as constitutional
concerns. For one, the government enforcers suggested that
pharmaceutical companies could and should be held liable for false
claims made to health care programs by providers because the
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provider's prescription decisions were based upon information provided
to them by the drug company, despite the fact that the company was
likely unaware that any of these claims were made by the physicians.81
Further, because the alleged communications by Warner-Lambert
about off-label uses were in fact truthful, the claims also raised
constitutional free speech issues.
Warner-Lambert initially fought these claims in federal district
court, but after losing a couple of key rulings at the motion to dismiss
and summary judgment stages, the company opted to settle. The
government prosecutors announced a $430 million settlement in May
2004, representing the largest health care fraud recovery since the
previously mentioned TAP Pharmaceuticals case in 2001. The bulk of
the monetary recovery consisted of criminal fines paid to the federal
government, though the settlement directed Warner-Lambert to pay
federal and state Medicaid programs $190 million for losses allegedly
incurred by the company's off-label marketing of Neurontin.
On the same day as this broader settlement, forty-six states
also entered into a separate but closely related settlement resolving
their consumer protection claims. In addition to injunctive provisions
aimed at baring Warner-Lambert from continuing its alleged off-label
marketing, the multistate settlement established a new "Neurontin
Multistate Executive Committee" headed by the attorneys general of
California and North Carolina.82 This new committee would administer
the new "Attorney General Consumer and Prescriber Education Grant
Program" funded by a $21 million payment by Warner-Lambert, the
purpose of which would be to fund programs around the country
designed to educate physicians and patients about prescription drug
marketing and other related issues. Governmental entities, academic
institutions, and not-for-profit groups would be eligible to apply for
grants from this program, which attorneys general on this committee
would administer. An additional $6 million of the states' settlement
was allocated to a "corrective advertisement campaign" regarding
Neurontin to be run by Warner-Lambert, and $10 million went directly

Anderson and Stamp, "Shooting the Messenger," at 9.
Order Governing the Administration of the Multistate Grant and Advertising
Program, In the Matter of Warner-Lambert Company, LLC (Circuit Court, County of
Marion, Oregon, 2004), ¶2.2 and ¶2.3.
81
82
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to the participating attorney general offices to compensate them for
investigation and litigation expenses.
This early Warner-Lambert settlement served as a beachhead
for numerous subsequent investigations of pharmaceutical companies’
off-label marketing strategies. This included a prominent state
litigation campaign concerning Purdue Pharma’s powerful pain reliever
OxyContin. After numerous criticisms from state officials that the FDA
had "turned its back on its serious responsibility with regard to
OxyContin" by allegedly ignoring how the company was persuading
providers to prescribe more frequent doses of the drug than that
approved by the FDA, state attorneys general took matters into their
own hands. A lengthy investigation by twenty-six states resulted in a
2007 settlement in which Purdue Pharma agreed to pay $19.5 million
to the states as well as significantly reform its marketing practices.
A recent multistate settlement concerning Eli Lilly's Zyprexa
further illustrates the extent of regulatory provisions contained in
these off-label marketing settlements. In 2007, several states sued Eli
Lilly claiming that the company launched an "aggressive" marketing
campaign in 2001 called "Viva Zyprexa!" in which the company
illegally marketed the drug for a number of off-label uses beyond its
FDA-approved use to treat schizophrenia and bipolar disorder.83
According to the lawsuits, which were based upon state consumer law,
Eli Lilly knew Zyprexa increased greatly the risk of diabetes, heart
attacks, and other health problems, but nevertheless actively
marketed it to doctors for use with patients who were not diagnosed
with mental illness. The company then failed to warn consumers of the
risks associated with the drug.84
As have a number of companies facing similar off-label
marketing lawsuits, Eli Lilly viewed the state lawsuits as a disservice to
patients who had been successfully treated by the drug after receiving
advice from their doctors. Eli Lilly also noted that all information they
provided to health care professionals was truthful, not "false and
misleading." Nevertheless, facing a growing number of state lawsuits
concerning the drug, the company entered into an agreement with
Andrew Ballard, "Eli Lilly to Pay States $62 Million Under Zyprexa Marketing
Settlement," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, October 10, 2008, 1153.
84 Sherry Jones, "Montana AG Joins Others in Suing Eli Lilly Over Marketing of
Zyprexa," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, March 16, 2007, 264.
83
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thirty-two states to resolve the investigation in 2008. The $62 million
settlement, then a record monetary recovery for a multistate
consumer protection case, placed a variety of regulatory restrictions
on the company. Among other requirements, the settlement barred Eli
Lilly from giving product samples of Zyprexa to health care providers
whose specialties are not consistent with Zyprexa’s label or from using
any grant funds to promote the drug.85 The settlement also required
Eli Lilly's medical staff, rather than its marketing staff, to have the
ultimate responsibility for the medical content of medical letters and
references regarding Zyprexa. In addition to these regulatory
provisions governing internal company operations, the agreement also
required a significant amount of new disclosures, including information
about grants received, lists of "promotional speakers and consultants
who were paid more than $100 for promotional speaking and/or
consulting," and the results of the company's clinical trials. Echoing a
number of his colleagues, Florida AG Bill McCollum described
agreement as a "landmark settlement [that] sends the message that
pharmaceutical companies will be held responsible for their actions,
including any inappropriate marketing practices which may promote
off-label uses that have not been approved."86

Establishing Greater Government Oversight of
Advertising
In addition to establishing stricter marketing practices and
disclosures on companies than federal law requires, several of recent
multistate settlements has used state consumer protection law as a
legal hook to create greater government oversight of a broad range of
pharmaceutical advertising in the future. In one settlement involving
Merck's blockbuster arthritis drug Vioxx, the states essentially
provided themselves to power to enforce provisions of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act – a power that is nowhere in the statute itself.
Merck voluntarily recalled Vioxx from the market in 2004 after a
study the company sponsored found that the drug nearly doubled the

Oregon Department of Justice, "AG Reaches §62 Million Settlement with Eli Lilly
Pharmaceutical," October 7, 2008, accessed March 21, 2011,
http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/2008/rel100708.shtml.
86 Ballard, "Eli Lilly to Pay States."
85
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risk of a heart attack and stroke.87 Shortly after the Vioxx recall,
several states began investigating Merck's marketing of the drug,
claiming that since 1999 the company waged an aggressive direct-toconsumer advertising campaign that misrepresented the safety of
Vioxx and concealed increased risks associated with the product's use.
These claims, again based upon state consumer protection law, were
resolved in what was then the largest consumer protection case
against a pharmaceutical company (prior to the Eli Lilly case
settlement noted above).
The settlement included a substantial $58 million monetary
payment to twenty-nine states, but as with many other consumer
protection settlements, the most important part of the settlement was
its regulatory provisions. As with the Eli Lilly Zyprexa settlement, the
states required Merck to adhere to a number of new procedures
relating to the disclosure of clinical trials and potential conflicts of
interest.88 The settlement also included a number of provisions
requiring anyone named on a Merck-sponsored study to adhere to a
variety of authorship conditions before their names can appear on the
study. This provision was meant to address controversies over socalled "ghostwriting" in the industry, in which companies would
allegedly pay authors to put their names on independent research that
was instead actually conducted by the pharmaceutical company.
Certain guidelines regarding these practices had been suggested by
the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors,89 but before
this settlement had not been required by any law or regulation in the
United States. This settlement provision, however, essentially adopted
the guidelines promulgated by this International Committee and
turned them into an affirmative requirement that Merck had to follow.
In addition to these regulatory requirements, the settlement
also contained provisions increasing the authority of the FDA to
oversee Merck's advertising. According to the settlement, Merck must
submit its television commercials to the FDA for approval before any

Drew Douglas, "Merck Will Pay $58 Million to Settle States' Probe Into Marketing of
Vioxx," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, May 23, 2008, 611.
88 Stipulated General Judgment, State of Oregon v. Merck & Co. (Circuit Court for the
County of Marion, Oregon, 2008).
89 International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, "Uniform Requirements for
Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals: Writing and Editing for Biomedical
Publication," accessed March 11, 2012, http://www.icmje.org/2008_urm.pdf.
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DTC advertisements are broadcast, further requiring the company to
comply with any FDA recommendation to delay advertising for new
pain medications. In a subsequent settlement with Merck over another
of its drugs, Vytorin, states extended this pre-clearance provision to
cover all of Merck's products, not just the drugs involved in the
investigations.90 These provisions mirrored several of the unsuccessful
attempts of congressional supporters to require FDA pre-approval of
DTC advertisements.91
In addition to increasing FDA oversight of Merck's DTC
advertising, the Vioxx settlement also essentially granted the power to
states to enforce federal law. In the settlement, Merck agreed to
refrain from making "false, misleading or deceptive" promotional
claims as defined under state law, as well as to comply with the Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act and FDA regulations in connection with
advertising and promotion. Merck was already under an affirmative
obligation to adhere to federal law and regulations or face potential
penalties from federal enforcers, but this provision allowed the state
attorneys general to oversee Merck's compliance with federal law as
well. Particularly since so many states had criticized the FDA's
performance in regulating pharmaceutical firms, this provided them
with additional leverage to forge ahead with the enforcement of federal
law even where the FDA has "failed" to do so.
One problem with the Vioxx settlement from the states'
perspective was that despite granting themselves additional ability to
enforce existing federal law, states still relied on the FDA to "properly"
review the DTC advertising the settlement required Merck to submit
before running the advertisements. The states solved this problem in a
subsequent settlement with Pfizer in October 2008 supplementing their
capacity to pre-clear DTC advertisements. This settlement resolved
thirty-three states' investigation of Pfizer's alleged off-label marketing
of a pair of Pfizer's drugs, Celebrex and Bextra.92 The $60 million
settlement included many of the same disclosure and conflicts of

Susanne Pagano, "Merck, Schering-Plough Settle With States Over Vytorin Study
Release," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, July 17, 2009, 821.
91 See, for example, Enhancing Drug Safety and Innovation Act of 2007 (S.484, 110th
Congress); Food and Drug Administration Safety Act of 2007 (S.468, 110th Congress).
92 Final Consent Judgment, State of New Jersey v. Pfizer Inc. (Superior Court of New
Jersey, No. MER-C-134-08). As with a number of these cases, the FDA chose not to
investigate Pfizer's alleged off-label marketing of these drugs.
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interest requirements that several previous settlements had, and
became the second multistate settlement to include a requirement that
a company receive pre-clearance of all of its DTC advertisements
before broadcasting them. Unlike the Merck settlement, however, the
Pfizer settlement required the company to report to the participating
state attorneys general if the FDA did not act within a certain amount
of time. The settlement also required Pfizer to provide the states with
all of the DTC advertising information that the company provided to
the FDA. Essentially, then, this provision created a two-layered
enforcement regime that simultaneously expanded the FDA's authority
while granting the states additional information with which to enforce
their new pre-clearance regulation if the FDA for whatever reason did
not act to enforce it.

Litigation as Drug Advertising Regulation
The increase in the number of investigations brought by states
targeting the marketing activities of pharmaceutical in recent years is
matched by the growing extensiveness of the regulations contained
within the settlements resolving the investigations. Table 2
summarizes several of the states' major multistate consumer
protection advertising cases brought against pharmaceutical firms in
recent years.93
TABLE 2: MULTISTATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LITIGATION
AGAINST PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS (THROUGH 2009)

States

Defendant

Product

19
states
46
states
30
states
26
states

Pfizer

Zithromax

Year
Settled
2003

WarnerLambert
Bayer

Neurontin

2004

Baycol

2007

Purdue
Pharma

OxyContin

2007

Significant Settlement Terms
$6 million; specific alterations to
advertisements
$38 million; corrective
advertisements
$8 million; disclosure of clinical
trial results
$19.5 million; various marketing
restrictions and disclosure
requirements

Note that Table 2 includes only multistate cases, and not industry settlements
reached by individual states.
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33
states

Pfizer

Celebrex;
Bextra

2008

32
states
29
states

Eli Lily

Zyprexa

2008

Merck

2008

35
states

Merck

Vioxx;
Zocor;
Pepcid
Vytorin

27
states

Bayer

Yaz

2009

2009

$60 million; pre-clearance
provisions, clinical trial
disclosures
$62 million; various disclosures
and marketing requirements
$58 million; pre-clearance
provisions, bans on
"ghostwriting"
$5.4 million; pre-clearance
provisions, disclosure of clinical
trial results, various conflict-ofinterest regulations
$20 million; pre-clearance
provision, corrective
advertisement campaign

By achieving settlement after settlement with some of the
nation's largest pharmaceutical firms, states have managed to step
into the role of Congress and the FDA by establishing stricter
marketing restrictions on industry than anything required by federal
statutes or regulations. In a few short years, states have managed to
implement strict rules concerning disclosure of clinical trial results,
new conflict of interest regulations, specific requirements companies
must follow when advertising their products, and requirements that
companies receive pre-clearance before running any DTC
advertisements.
While these provisions technically only apply to the companies
party to a particular settlement, they provide a new regulatory
baseline the entire industry must follow to be certain that they will not
be subject to potentially expensive multistate investigations that could
harm their public image. This is why the states' frequent talk about
these settlements "sending a message" to the entire pharmaceutical
industry is not mere bluster. Indeed, the impact of the settlements
even beyond the significant consequences for the individual companies
involved in the agreements is apparent when the pharmaceutical
industry peak association adopted new voluntary guidelines aiming to
help avoid liability for its members. These guidelines were mirrored
after recent multistate settlements.94

For example, see "PhRMA Issues Drug Advertising Guidelines, But Some Want
Moratorium, Firmer Oversight," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, August 5,
94

2012 Midwest Political Science Conference, Chicago, IL, April 12-15, 2012, This article is © Midwest Political Science
Association and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Midwest Political
Science Association does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere
without the express permission from Midwest Political Science Association.

40

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Through their investigations and settlements, state prosecutors
have built themselves up as a sort of miniature FDA on the state level.
Even as Congress and the FDA generally viewed DTC and off-label
marketing generally in a positive light, adopting policies loosening
advertising restrictions on drug firms, the states have pursued
precisely the opposite policy agenda through a series of regulatory
settlements. Relying heavily on state consumer protection law, states
have been able to redefine the responsibilities of the pharmaceutical
industry nationwide in relation to the marketing of their products.
Despite facing no such requirements in federal statutes or regulations,
several companies must now abide by the provisions of multistate
settlements, including new disclosure requirements and preclearance
provisions. Further, the states have used these settlements to extend
government regulatory oversight over drug company advertisements
into the future and build up their own enforcement capacity. The new
requirements that the FDA pre-clear DTC advertisements granted the
FDA powers the agency did not even seek out for itself. While helping
to build up the FDA's regulatory power, the states also built up their
own. The Vioxx and Vytorin settlements, for example, gave the states
the ability to enforce federal laws and regulations against Merck. The
Celebrex and Bextra settlements contained provisions giving states
more tools to monitor industry compliance with their new regulations.
This action by states allowed another avenue for critics of the
drug industry to press their claims. After failing to recalibrate the
balance of concerns established by Congress and the FDA in these
areas, state prosecutions served as an opportunity point to achieve
these regulatory changes in a different venue. What is more, this
method of policymaking has been able to not only sidestep the broader
national debate about drug regulation, but it has also been able to
sidestep some important constitutional issues as well. Attempts in
Congress to require drug companies to pre-clear their advertisements
with the FDA before broadcast have generally failed, largely because of

2005, 823; "International Pharma Trade Group Adopts New Code Barring Some
Marketing Activities," Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, January 5, 2007, 16; "Rx
Industry Group Issues New Guidelines For Companies on Direct-to-Consumer Ads,"
Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, December 12, 2008, 1382.
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concerns that any such legislation or agency regulations would be
unconstitutional restraints on speech.95
The preclearance provisions established by the states get
around this constitutional constraint by placing the preclearance
requirement in an out-of-court settlement. Because the states'
preclearance provision is the result of an "agreement" between the
states and the involved companies, it is not vulnerable to the same
sort of constitutional challenges that a congressional enactment or
agency regulation would be. After all, if the company agreed to abide
by this provision, how could it then turn around and claim that it is
unconstitutional? As indicated throughout this dissertation, however,
companies often do not agree with the legal theories employed by the
states but nevertheless feel compelled to sign settlements to reduce
their own risk and uncertainty. Merck, for example, objected to
preclearance provisions as unconstitutional prior restraints before
ultimately acceding to them in order to resolve all of the government
litigation surrounding the drug. Essentially, the states have discovered
a way to leverage state judicial power to force settlements, but
simultaneously shield the regulations contained therein from
constitutional challenge by placing them in an out-of-court
"agreement."

Conclusion
The recent rise of state pharmaceutical litigation is important for
several reasons. For one, underlying this litigation is a new style of
policymaking that has not received the attention it deserves. While
state prosecutors typically characterize their lawsuits and
investigations as "law enforcement," the reality is that these litigation
campaigns go beyond merely "enforcing" the law and instead give
prosecutors the opportunity to redefine corporate responsibilities. In
conjunction with the federal DOJ and private litigants, state litigation
redefined the "AWP" pricing mechanism used in government health
care programs as "fraudulent" despite the industry relying upon this
pricing structure for years. State litigation also cracked down on two of
the chief ways in which pharmaceutical firms promote their products
Natasha Singer, "Citing Risks, Lawmakers Seek to Curb Drug Commercials," New
York Times, July 27, 2009, B1.For example, see Representative Jerrold Nadler's (DNY) comments in ibid. (''On First Amendment grounds, I am not going to say we will
ban'' drug advertising).
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by litigating a host of DTC and off-label advertising cases, using this
litigation as a vehicle for regulatory requirements not required under
federal law.
The goal of these lawsuits was generally not to win in court, but
rather to achieve large settlements with key members of the drug
industry. In addition to large monetary payouts, these settlements
have contained a variety of provisions adding additional regulatory
requirements on the industry going beyond that required by
congressional enactments and agency policy. By resolving these
disputes by means less formal than active litigation in court, this
settlement process amounts to "bargaining in the shadow of the
law."96 Particularly interesting, however, is that "the law" casting a
shadow over the process is typically state law, including state False
Claims Acts as well as state antitrust and consumer protection
statutes. While state law casts the shadow in this bargaining process,
the result is new policy dictating new regulatory requirements that
apply nationwide, settlement by settlement, to one of the United
States’ largest industries.
In some ways, achieving policy results through settlements is
even more powerful than those reached by the typical lawmaking or
regulatory process, because they are immune from judicial review.
This is a particularly important benefit to regulation reached through
out-of-court settlements, given the shaky legal ground of many of
these lawsuits. The contention that AWP was "fraudulent" faced a
number of legal problems, including the fact that doctors, not
pharmaceutical firms, actually benefited from the AWP spread, as well
as the fact that governments knew for years that AWP really meant
"Ain't What's Paid." Attempts to regulate drug advertising – either by
requiring pre-clearance of DTC advertising or by restricting companies'
ability to distribute truthful information about their drugs to physicians
– raises important free speech issues arising under the First
Amendment. By lodging their regulation of the pharmaceutical industry
in out-of-court settlements, states have sidestepped potential legal
challenges to these provisions. Ironically, then, states have
simultaneously leveraged the judicial power to force new regulations

Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce," Yale Law Journal, Apr. 1979.
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through settlements, but then insulated these regulations from future
review by courts.
Further, this litigation illustrates how it is important to tie in
legal actions to the broader political climate. Using litigation and
settlements to achieve stricter regulatory oversight of pharmaceutical
firm activities occurred only after advocates of policy change failed to
make these changes in Congress. This failure moved the action to
different venues in the America separation of powers system – both
horizontally towards courts and litigation and vertically to the states.
As litigators on the state level, state prosecutors are perfectly
positioned as an alternative policy venue to take advantage of the
demand for policy change.
The state prosecutors frequently claim to be acting only because
of alleged congressional and federal agency "inaction," but it is worth
noting that this "inaction" on the federal level was actually a conscious
decision to balance the regulatory regime in a manner different than
what the litigators sought. Congress, for example, did not alter the
AWP payment system because of concerns that lower payments to
health care providers would serve to stop providing Medicaid services.
Congress and the FDA alike maintained a looser regulatory approach
to DTC advertising and off-label marketing because of the belief that
these marketing efforts could have positive health benefits. By
achieving settlements that, piece by piece, served to place stricter
regulations on the industry, states effectively recalibrated the balance
of concerns previously achieved by federal institutions.
It should also be noted that in addition to altering the regulatory
landscape, state litigation and settlements helped to alter the political
landscape as well. After years of refusing to substantially change the
AWP formula for drug reimbursements, Congress did an about-face
following the success of the Bayer and TAP settlements and the wave
of state litigation that followed. Building upon the existing federal and
state investigations, an increasing number of members of Congress
decided to respond with their own investigations.97 Indeed, key
congressional committees sought and incorporated information from

"House Committee Questions Drugmakers In Expanded Medicaid Fraud Investigation,"
Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, July 4, 2003, 711.
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these lawsuits as part of their own congressional investigations.98 After
decades of acknowledging the AWP payment system as accepted
practice, Congress held at least two hearings on the problem of pricing
"fraud" following the federal and multistate Bayer and TAP settlements
and subsequent individual state litigation.99
Ultimately, Congress increasingly accepted the view of AWP-asfraud and ratified the settlements achieved by federal and state
prosecutors. Congress codified the new ASP benchmark – created and
defined in the Bayer and TAP settlements and subsequent state
complaints – in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003. In essence, this was acquiescing to the
national changes in pharmaceutical pricing that the states were
already achieving, settlement by settlement, through their litigation.
Congress made several policy changes following the states'
other multistate pharmaceutical litigation campaigns as well.
Congress's subsequent ratification of a number of the regulatory
disclosure requirements resulting from the states' consumer protection
settlements, such as regarding the results of internal clinical trials,
applied these provisions to the entire industry.100 Further, state
litigation has forced the industry peak association to reevaluate its own
guidelines for its members, providing vindication for attorneys general
who wished for their settlements with individual industry leaders to
"send a message" to the broader industry.
Understanding policymaking in a fragmented political system
like the United States involves a great number of subtleties and
complexities, as the state litigation campaigns against pharmaceutical
companies indicate. However, this complexity should not deter close
examinations of the interactions between different political actors in
the making of public policy. Policy failures at one venue may spur a
transformation of the means of policy creation at another. This is

"Grassley Asks DOJ for Confidential Information From Medicaid Investigations,"
Pharmaceutical Law & Industry Report, May 28, 2004, 604.
99 Medicare Drug Reimbursements: A Broken System for Patients and Taxpayers, Joint
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Health and the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, September 21, 2001 (No 107-65); Medicaid Prescription Drug
Reimbursement: Why the Government Pays Too Much, Joint Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, December 7, 2004 (No. 108-126).
100 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(3)(D)
(expanding required clinical trial disclosures by pharmaceutical firms).
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precisely what has happened with the growth of state litigation in
recent years, in pharmaceutical litigation and beyond. State litigation
is particularly a rich area for exploration because it involves both the
horizontal aspects of fragmentation (interactions of the courts,
Congress, and administrative agencies) as well as the vertical
interactions (states and the federal government). As state litigators
continue to make headlines and aggressively target the federal
government and private corporations alike in their lawsuits and
investigations, it is all the more important for scholars to continue
exploring the implications of this emerging activity for the broader
American political system.
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